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Reconceptualizing Security Strategies For Courts: Developing A Typology For 
Safer Court Environments  
By Professor Anne Wallace, Edith Cowan University1, Professor Deborah Blackman, University of Canberra, and 
Dr. Emma Rowden, University of Technology, Sydney 
 
 
Abstract:  
 
There have been heightened concerns about security in courts in recent years, prompting a strong response that has largely 
been focused on perimeter security.  This paper draws on recent research conducted in Australian on court user’s safety needs, 
to propose a typology for designing safer courtroom environments that moves beyond the entry point to the court, and 
incorporates consideration of process and design elements. 
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1. Introduction 
Courts in Australia have experienced heightened concerns about security over the past 30 years.2  These arose, initially, 
as a result of a number of serious incidents of violence in court buildings and the shooting of a judge at their private 
home,3 and more recently, a senior civil servant in their workplace.4 The aftermath of 9/11 and the Bali Bombings and the 
trial of a number of alleged terrorist cases in Australian courts have further increased concerns about the possibility of 
terrorist attacks on court buildings.5 
 
A strong response to these concerns has seen ‘a massive … injection of public funding into court security, along with 
training and infrastructure and research into the science of security.’6  Its major focus has been the taking of ‘extraordinary 
steps to ensure that those entering our courts pass through a secure point of entry.’7  These perimeter security systems 
usually involve tools such as scanners and metal detectors to search for weapons.8  Court staff are issued coded security 
cards for entry and required to carry photographic identification.  Inside the court building, separate circulation zones for 
court staff, judicial officers, defendants, jurors, and the public are designed to avoid the risk of confrontation9 and 
surveillance tools such as CCTV cameras are used to monitor risk. 10 
 
These measures have largely been reactive, with a focus on physical safety. There has been little research into the actual 
and perceived safety needs of court user communities,11 the psychological impact of court environments12 and the extent 
1 Professor Anne Wallace PhD, Head, School of Law & Justice, Edith Cowan University, Australia, e-mial:a.wallace@ecu.edu.au 
2 Sarre, R. and Prenzler, T (2012) ‘Issues in courtroom security: A key role for the private sector in Australia and New Zealand’ 
Security Journal 25(a), 25. 
3  Ibid 25-6; see also: McQueen, R. (1998) ‘Of Wigs and Gowns: A Short History of Legal and Judicial Dress in Australia.’ Law in 
Context, 16(1), 50-1; E. R. Baker and P. I. Rose, 'Opas, David Louis (1936–1980)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre 
of Biography, Australian National University, <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/opas-david-louis-11310/text20189> accessed 12 June 
2013. 
4  Melissa Sweet, ‘I’ve been Shot, I’ve been Shot’, (SMH, May 26, 2006) at <http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/ive-been-shot-ive-
been-shot/2006/05/26/1148524888490.html> accessed 10 May 2013 
5  For a listing of some of these cases see Australian Parliamentary Library, ‘Terrorism Court Cases’ at 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Browse_by_Topic/TerrorismLaw/Courtca
ses> accessed 10 May 2013; see also cases referred to in Tait, D. 2011, 'Glass Cages in the Dock?: Presenting the Perpetrator to the 
Jury', Chicago-Kent Law Review, 86(2): 467-495. 
6  Sarr and Prenzler, above n 1, 27. 
7  Ibid 25-6. 
8  Ibid 26. 
9  Cooper, C. (2007) ‘The Evolving Concept of “Court Security”’ Justice System Journal, 28(1), 40. 
10  Sarr and Prenzler, above n 1, 26. 
11  Most of the literature on courthouse safety and security focuses on threats to the staff and judiciary (e.g: Griebel, M. & Phillips, T., 
‘Architectural Design for Security in Courthouse Facilities,’ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 576, 
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to which those environments increase stress or discomfort for participants in the justice system.  The terms “safety” and 
“security” have often been used interchangeably in public debate and in the formulation of responses. 
This article draws on recent Australian research into the safety needs of court users, using a broad definition that, in 
addition to physical safety, encompasses psychological safety, cultural safety13 and safety of access, commonly termed 
“accessibility”. In our view, “safety” and “security” are distinct concepts and “security” is better understood as the range of 
strategies that might be deployed to address threats to safety. These include processes, such as risk management 
strategies and the deployment of security guards, and the installation of equipment, such as CCTV cameras, x-ray 
machines, walk-through scanners and other physical measures. While security measures are intended to ensure the 
safety of court users, the one does not necessarily flow from the other.  This distinction is implicit in some of the existing 
discourse concerning safety in courts; for example, the Family Court of Australia’s 2004-5 Family Violence Strategy policy 
document, refers to the “primacy of safety”, that: 
 
… requires a comprehensive, integrated approach to the management of security at Court premises and 
during all Court events. Security policy needs to be comprehensive to ensure that safety is a factor that is 
considered in relation to all Court processes as well as the Court’s physical environment.14  
 
Key themes and issues identified from our research findings are analyzed using a “hard” versus “soft” system approach, 
outlined below. This enables us to identify what types of security strategies might be directed to particular safety 
concerns, and where responsibility might lie for their implementation.  A key finding is that safeguarding court users often 
requires a collaborative approach that moves beyond perimeter security. 
 
 
2.  Methodology 
The data referred to in this article derives from a three-year study ‘Fortress or sanctuary? Enhancing court safety by 
managing people, places and processes’ funded by the Australian Research Council and supported by industry partners, 
including the Family Court of Australia, the Western Australia Department of Justice and Attorney General, the Courts 
Administration Authority of South Australia, Magistrates Court of Victoria, the New Zealand Ministry of Justice, Myriad 
Consultants Pty Ltd, PTW Architects, Lyons Architects and security consultants Connley Walker Pty Ltd.15 The project 
that sought to investigate the safety needs of court participants, to provide a comparative analysis of safety processes, 
practices and designs in five jurisdictions, document the safety experience and expectations of stakeholders, and to 
develop best practice guidelines for providing safer court environments. 
 
This article draws on key themes emerging from interview and “court user jury” focus group discourse.16 Eighty-seven 
stakeholders were interviewed, using a semi-structured interview format. They include judges, magistrates, court officers, 
court security staff, prosecution and defense lawyers, specialist court staff who liaise with, or support, court users, victim 
support officers, community advocates and volunteer court support workers. 66 stakeholders participated in “user juries” 
who, after inspecting particular court facilities, were de-briefed on their observations and perceptions in a focus group 
using a semi-structured question format.  They included stakeholders from community advocacy groups, and support 
services for victims of sexual assault and family violence, the physically and intellectually disabled, refugees and 
members of indigenous communities. Axial and thematic coding17 of the qualitative discourse disclosed a number of 
elements that, based on the experiences narrated by the interviewees and “user jury” stakeholders, were analyzed by the 
research team as impacting upon perceptions of safety within the court environment. Further grouping and analysis of 
these elements led to the development of a new typology of safer court environments. 
 
 
Courthouse Violence: Protecting the Judicial Workplace (July. 2001), 118-131). There is large body of literature concerned with the 
safety needs of court participants such as victims of family violence, vulnerable and child witnesses, but little on the broader court user 
population. Security strategies involving environmental design focus on physical separation, segregation and the use of physical 
barriers to limit ‘breaches, with little attention is paid to design elements that might de-escalate violent situations, such as those 
suggested in the environmental-behavioural literature.     
12  For a notable exception, see: Missingham, G., Heywood, C. & Brawn, G., ‘Architectural Psychology and Courts Buildings’, 
(unpublished report prepared for Department of Justice, Western Australia, 2002). On file with authors. 
13  Papps, E., & Ramsden, I. (1996), ‘Cultural safety in nursing: The New Zealand experience’ 8(5) International Journal of Qualitative 
Health Care, 491-497. 
14  Family Court of Australia, Family Violence Strategy, 2004-5, 
<http://www.familycourt.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/FCOA/home/about/Initiatives/FV/FCOA_fv_Strategy>, accessed 26 June 2013. 
15  ARC Linkage Project LP0882179 (2008-11).  
16   Tait D., Missingham, G., Vernon, A., Rowden, E., ‘Court Safety Draft Key Themes: (31 January – 1 February 2012)’, last 
updated April, 2012. Unpublished document on file with authors. 
17  Pandit, N.R. (1996). ‘The Creation of Theory: A Recent Application of the Grounded Theory Method’. The Qualitative Report, 2 (4), 
http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR2-4/pandit.html, accessed 2/12/2012. 
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3.  Developing a Typology for Safer Court Environments 
Initially the elements identified in the qualitative data, or discourse, were grouped into broad themes. These themes 
highlight the key concerns of court users and court staff in relation to creating feelings of safety in court environments. The 
analysis below should be read not solely as a critique, but also as a way of categorizing current policies which, in some 
cases, are making steps in the right direction towards an integrated approach to providing safer environments for all court 
users.  
 
To illustrate, we take an example mentioned frequently in the interview discourse: the fear voiced by victims of family 
violence about the potential for physical, verbal and other forms of intimidation on encountering the perpetrator in the 
court room or court building.18  
 
Table 1:  Common themes in relation to safety of victims: 
 
Preparation for the hearing/appearance:  There is a need for sufficient briefing information and support for the 
victim to be provided to ensure that their stress is not added to by inadequate preparation for the court event. 
 
Waiting:  There is a requirement for both victim and perpetrator to wait for the matter to be heard. The provision of 
adequate waiting spaces within the court to avoid contact with the perpetrator is important for the safety of the 
victim while they wait for the court event. 
 
Intimidation:  How are concerns about non-verbal intimidation, or ‘code’ that would be familiar to the victim, as 
well as direct physical or verbal threats identified and handled, is a significant issue that impacts upon perceptions 
of safety for victims.   
 
Separation and segregation:  How the victim and the perpetrator might be kept separate, both prior to their 
respective appearances in the courtroom, and in the courtroom has safety implications. Former victims expressed 
the impossible situation faced in the public areas of the courthouse and having to choose between feeling fearful 
of becoming a ‘sitting duck’ waiting for the court appearance in waiting areas that are easily surveilled by court 
security staff, or risk being ‘cornered’ in the more hidden public areas, where harassment could occur out of the 
sight of security guards. 
 
Security presence:  The visible presence of security staff, for example, in court waiting areas is a factor that might 
reduce the risk of violence or intimidation. 
 
Intelligence gathering, planning ahead: The collection and analysis of data on case types and court users is a 
strategy employed by some courts to gather intelligence on the risk of violence and intimidation in order to make 
appropriate plans to prevent incidents.  For example, all family violence cases might be listed in a particular court 
on a particular day, so that security resources could be concentrated in that area. 
 
Breaches and escalation:  The need for clear guidance, not just for court staff, but for court users, as to when and 
how to report safety fears, is a significant factor in how breaches of security or escalation of violent behaviour is 
minimised.  Stakeholders view a timely response to escalation of threats to safety as important. 
 
Closer inspection and interrogation of the discourse revealed that there were two distinct ways of classifying these 
themes. The first method of classification identifies whether security measures to improve safety relate more to a 
particular physical location or more to a process operating within the court.  The second uses “hard” versus “soft” systems 
analysis.  We then combine both methods of classification to devise a typology that aims to recognize how responsibility 
for devising appropriate security measures might be identified. We argue that this provides a useful typology for analyzing, 
and improving upon, current court security strategies designed to provide safer court environments.  
 
4.  Potential Interventions 
One way of looking at potential security interventions is to categorise them as either relating more to place or more to 
process.  
 
• Place was where the potential safety solutions were aligned to the actual building or its layout.  
Examples relevant to the perpetrator-victim scenario include: the location of security screening; the use of CCTV 
cameras to monitor movement through the building; the routes in and out of a building; the design of a waiting room; 
18  Such an encounter might occur in relation to criminal proceedings for an assault, on a civil or criminal process for a restraining 
order, or for family court proceedings un-related to the violence itself.. 
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the location of the front desk; the form and location of signage; design that creates potentially unsafe corners or 
corridors; and floorplan layouts that restrict opportunities to separate parties. 
• Process was where safety solutions were aligned to processes that operate within the court building.  
Examples relevant to the perpetrator-victim scenario include: “gatekeeper” reception staff who advise timings and 
locations to court users; processes that do or do not enable anonymity, require court users to “wait your turn”, or do 
not enable separation; the availability of child-minding support; the clarity and application of rules; court users’ 
perceptions of acceptable behavior in the court building; the tension inherent in public proceedings about personal 
matters; providing sufficient preparation for the court appearance;  and the level of empathy displayed by court staff.  
 
 
Figure 1: Strategies and interventions as identified for the victim safety example, as sorted by Place and Process. 
 
 Applying this classification to the themes identified in the data for our example revealed several limitations.  While it is 
possible to identify some themes (such as intelligence gathering/planning ahead, breaches and escalation) as pertaining 
more to “process”, other themes (such as security presence, waiting, intimidation) could be supported or hindered by both 
the nature of the place or the process – see Figure 1.  For example, “waiting” is often a requirement of the process by 
which cases are heard and managed. However, it also occurs in a physical place, such as foyer, or seating area outside a 
courtroom. “Intimidation” as a process, may occur in that physical space, where the perpetrator, their family or other 
supporters, are co-located with the victim witness. A victim might seek out a separate space or might be offered a 
separate, secure, waiting space, supported by a process within the court to enable waiting victim witnesses to be 
identified and offered that support.  A “security presence” in the waiting area might detect, or deter, intimidation to some 
extent. Such a presence would relate to that particular physical space, but would be arranged by a process that identified 
the need for it.  It might also ensure, for example, that security staff was alerted to look for more subtle signs of 
intimidation, such as non-verbal signals passing between the perpetrator and their supporters, and the victim witness. 
 
The overlap also reveals another limitation: a “process” / “place” classification might suggest that responsibility for security 
can be clearly identified as either something that must be addressed by those responsible for writing courthouse design 
briefs for architects, (court administrators, building owners/operators, judiciary, or other stakeholders) or by those 
responsible for managing the people employed within the building or the cases heard in the court. In practice, identifying 
responsibility for devising and implementing solutions to safety concerns in court buildings is more complex. 
 
5.  Responsibility for Devising and Implementing Solutions 
To overcome those limitations, we drew on Checkland’s work on systems thinking19 and the concept of “hard” versus 
“soft” thinking to analyze the discourse in terms of responsibility for devising and implementing solutions. This approach 
has been widely applied to decision-making across a range of fields. 
 
In this conceptual framework, a “hard” system is one in which the observer or manager observes the system’s elements 
and assumes that they can manage it in such a way as to optimize its capacity to achieve pre-planned goals20; it becomes 
19  Checkland P.B., Scholes J. 1990. Soft Systems Methodology in Action. Wiley: Chichester; Checkland P. 1981. Systems Thinking, 
Systems Practice. John Wiley: New York; Checkland P.B. 1999. Soft Systems Methodology: A 30-year Retrospective. Wiley: 
Chichester. 
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about configuration and order. A specific application of hard versus soft, found in systems engineering, includes a 
sequence of problem solving steps: (a) define what is needed in the context of the existing system; (b) generate alternate 
systems that may satisfy the identified need; (c) select and implement one of these alternate systems; (d) monitor the 
effectiveness of the alternate system in meeting the identified need; (e) modify the alternate system based on feedback 
from the system; (f) introduce wider implementation of the alternate system and repeat the last two steps, as required.21 
Soft systems, by contrast, are defined as those where the observer considers the system to be complex and created by 
those within it22; change will emerge through learning about the system in conjunction with those who are a part of the 
system. Because it is assumed that individuals vary in beliefs and values, then improvements are expected to emerge 
through improved communication, collaboration and coproduction of the ideas23.  
 
The concept of hard versus soft systems has been applied more widely to a range of disciplines. Of interest to us in this 
paper is the application within the human resources arena (‘HRM’). Legge24 for example suggested two different models 
or orientations: “Hard” HRM orientation which is represented by the structure, functions and processes; and the “Soft” 
HRM orientation which focused on culture and behavioral orientations of organizational members.25 Consequently, hard 
HRM is unitary, focusing upon the resource side of human resources, that emphasizes costs in the form of “head counts” 
and places control firmly in the hands of management; the goal is to effectively align the human capital and numbers with 
the organizational requirements.26 Conversely, soft HRM assumes that the system will be more effective if employees are 
treated as valued assets who are an integral part of the system; improvement results from their commitment, adaptability 
and high quality skill and performance.27  
 
The themes identified in Table 2 below can be categorized as issues where managers can “do” something to apparently 
improve safety both in terms of Places and Processes. These are then determined as “hard”. Where the way that Place or 
Process is discussed implies a collaborative approach with multiple stakeholders, then this will be classified as soft – see 
Table 2 below.  
Hard 
 
 
• Waiting 
• Security Presence 
• Separation and Segregation 
• Breaches and escalation  
Soft 
 
• Intimidation 
• Intelligence gathering, planning ahead  
• Preparation for the appearance/hearing 
Table 2: Strategies and interventions identified for Safety sorted by Hard and Soft 
 
6.  Integrating the Classification of the Themes 
By combining our two approaches to classification we have developed a typology to capture the themes and ideas 
emerging from the discourse.  The purpose of this typology is to identify where influence and responsibility for improving 
court safety lies, and in doing so, assist courts in devising strategies to achieve it.  We suggest that enhancing safety in 
courts requires collaborative approaches between those who create court spaces, those who manage them, those who 
devise court processes and the court users. 
 
Table 3 below represents what we have called the four quadrants of court safety. On one axis, we have places and 
processes.  Place denotes buildings but also includes architectural spaces, immovable objects, such as signs, furniture 
20  Yan Zexian and Yan Xuhui (1996). A revolution in the field of systems thinking—a review of Checkland's system thinking.  Systems 
Research & Behavioral Science. Mar/Apr 27 (2): 140-155.  
21  Checkland (1981) above n 20.  
22  Zexian, Y. and Xuhui, Y. (1996). ‘A revolution in the field of systems thinking—a review of Checkland's system thinking.’  Systems 
Research & Behavioral Science. Mar/Apr 27 (2): 140-155.  
23  Johnson, G.M. (2008). ‘Firm systems thinking: unifying educational problem solving.’ Systems Research & Behavioral Science, 
Nov/Dec 25 (6): 797-805.  
24  Legge, K. (1995). Human Resource Management: Rhetorics and Realities. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
25  See also Fombrun, C.J. (1983) 'Strategic Management: Integrating the Human Resource Systems into Strategic Planning'. 
Advances in Strategic Management, 2. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press; Fombrun. C.J. and Tichy. N.M. (1983) 'Strategic Planning and 
Human Resources Management: at Rainbow's End'. In Lamb. R. (ed.) Recent Advances in Strategic Planning. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
26  Storey, J. (1987) 'Developments in the management of human resources: an interim report', Warwick Papers in Industrial 
Relations, 17, IRRU, School of Industrial and Business Studies, University of Warwick (November); Bach, S. (2005). Managing Human 
Resources: Personnel Management in Transition. Oxford, UK.: Blackwell Publishing. 
27  Barney, J. (1991). 'Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage', Journal of Management, 17 (1): pp. 99-120; Gill, C. 
(1999). ‘Use of Hard and Soft Models of HRM to illustrate the gap between Rhetoric and Reality in Workforce Management’. RMIT 
Working Paper Series, http://mams.rmit.edu.au/d4lhtsmk45c.pdf accessed 2/12/2012; Barney, J., Wright, M. and Ketchen, D.J. (2001). 
‘The resource-based view of the firm: Ten years after 1991’. Journal of Management, 27, 625–641. 
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and equipment.  Processes refers to any regulation, system or practice designed to frame the behavior of individuals.  
What becomes clear, as we develop the typology, is that a third “p” — people — is the subject of the other two, that is, 
places and processes.  This includes those who use courts — litigants, media, members of the public, lawyers — and 
those who work in them — judicial officers, court staff, security personnel. 
 
On the second axis, we use the word “hard” to denote something that is immovable, fixed or inflexible.  It is likely that the 
people who are supported by hard processes are the court officials, judges and professional users, such as lawyers and 
prosecutors.  “Soft”, on the other hand, denotes something that is focused upon ordinary court users and clients and is 
flexible, supportive and usually adaptable.  The four quadrants are: 
 
1. Inflexible Environments where the solutions are designed for the users through the architecture, building layout 
etc.; 
2. Regulatory Systems where there are regulated, legislated and enacted processes which are designed and 
enacted for the users by others; 
3. Flexible environments where the users are able to use and influence the places in ways that make them feel 
safer; and 
4. Supportive practices where all involved work together to make the users feel as safe and secure as possible. 
 
When the original elements identified in the discourse (Process and Place) are mapped to the typology the result is 
illustrated in Table 3 below: 
 
 Places Processes 
Hard Inflexible Environments Regulatory Systems 
Soft Flexible Environments Supportive Practices 
Table 3: Four quadrants of Court Safety 
 
Having applied the typology it becomes clear that the fundamental difference between the quadrants lies in who is 
responsible for the enactment of the safety solutions.  To return to our example to illustrate: 
 
The legal process involved will determine whether the victim and the perpetrator are required to be present at the same 
time in the same vicinity, which will in turn determine whether they have to wait (process) and where (place).  The physical 
features of the court building will influence the extent to which an interaction between the victim and the perpetrator might 
occur: are there separate waiting rooms for witnesses and their supporters; are there discrete entrances for vulnerable 
witnesses?  In terms of preparation, legal rules that apply for alternative methods such as video-link might play a role, 
(process) as might the availability or otherwise of those facilities (place). The provision of information to the victim about 
the processes and facilities could be important.  The court itself might gather intelligence in a number of ways about the 
likelihood of encounters between a victim and the perpetrator (and their respective supporters) (process), and might use 
surveillance systems to monitor the movement of the parties (place and process). The availability and form of support for 
the victim can be important in ameliorating stress and providing timely information on safety strategies (process).  
Screening systems at the courthouse door can detect weapons that might be used in a physical attack (place). 
 
These can be further classified into safety issues that are aligned to the building and its layout and those aligned to 
processes that operate within the building. 
 
Applying the typology (see Figure 3 below) helps us to see how safety might be analyzed, in order to be improved upon, 
in the given example: 
 
 PLACES PROCESSES 
HARD Inflexible Environments  
Separation  
Security Presence 
Regulatory Systems  
Breaches & Escalation 
Waiting 
Security Presence 
SOFT Flexible Environments 
Waiting 
Supportive Practices  
Intelligence/Advance planning 
Preparation 
Separation 
Table 4: Victim of Violence: a safety typology 
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Table 4 demonstrates that there are certain aspects that are “inflexible” or difficult to adjust; they are “hard”.  For instance, 
the physical limitations of buildings may or make not make it easy to provide separate and secure waiting areas to 
segregate victims and perpetrators, and to station security personnel at strategic points, although most courts provide 
perimeter-screening security. Surveillance systems and safety procedures for identifying and dealing with breaches of 
safety will exist; generally these might be capable of being adjusted over time, but not in the immediate situation. Waiting 
is an inevitable aspect to court processes.  
 
However, supportive “soft” practices can make victims more informed about the process, their rights, the facilities and 
support available to them to deal with, or report, intimidation and make choices that will assist to keep them safe in the 
court environment.  Intelligence planning enables the court to plan ahead minimizing potential conflict situations.  These 
solutions require collaborative approaches between victims, their support groups, court and security staff. Enabling 
environments will also be user centric, they will be designed to assist users to easily find their way to places and facilities 
within the building that provide information or meet other needs: for example witness support facilities, legal aid and, 
importantly, facilities that provide for basic human needs such as toilets and drinking water, while they are waiting. 
 
This example illustrates the application of the typology to only one situation where court users may experience safety 
concerns (although one that emerged frequently in the data.)  Obviously what type of security measures are required to 
achieve safety for each individual court user in each court may depend on a large number of variables:  the nature of the 
particular safety concern, the physical environment of the court, the type of matters dealt with by the court, the volume of 
cases, the demographic characteristics of the court’s users, its resources (both physical and human), the nature and 
availability of legal and support services, to name but a few.  
 
7.  Conclusion 
In this paper we have used definitions of safety from court users to develop a four-quadrant typology of court safety. We 
use the axes Hard/Soft and Process/Place to establish the range of options available to court designers and managers in 
developing security strategies.  
 
Current court security strategies are still often focused on hard systems, principally centered on aspects of place, such as 
“airport style” security screening and other features that emphasize perimeter security. However, in recent years there has 
been growing awareness that flexible environments and supportive practices can also play an important role in ensuring 
the safety of court users.  This was borne out by the findings of this research, where court users were very clear that they 
need a combination of what we would describe as soft and hard approaches to assure long term, effective safety. Such 
approaches may also give the courts more flexibility to adapt to changing safety concerns in the future.  
  
The typology we have developed is a useful way of identifying the elements of a court security strategy that encourages a 
holistic analysis of court user needs, and not just the provision of signifiers that a courthouse is “secure” or that a court 
process will be “safe” to participate in. In any given scenario all four quadrants should have entries addressing what is 
needed to ensure user safety. In order to ensure effective implementation of the strategies identified it will be critical to 
ensure that there is a focus on collaboration with the court users thereby enabling the co-creation of court safety. We 
advocate that further research is required to establish how to integrate court users into the development of these soft 
elements approaches to ensure that a full range of possible safety solutions is available to meet their needs. 
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